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Research on norms in International Relations (IR) includes various concepts related to
how norms inﬂuence actions. These approaches focus on the decision-making process,
and largely neglect the operationalization of norms. This omission leads to an analytical
gap: a lack of attention to how the substance of abstract norms is transformed and
constructed in the operationalization process. This article draws on the Foucauldian
theme of governmentality to introduce a novel perspective on operationalizing norms.
It focusses in particular on the role of techniques as understudied parts inherent to the
reﬂexive processes of operationalization and meaning production. The article thereby
contests the prevalence of fundamental norms in conventional IR theory. It demonstrates,
instead, that global governance techniques do not simply translate rationalities into
practice, but construct their very own normativities. These theoretical reﬂections are
illustrated by analysing the operationalization of norms through indicators in the case of
the European Union’s human rights policy.
Keywords: norms; operationalization; governmentality; logic of action; EU;
human rights
At its most basic, International Relations (IR) research concerned with
analysing actions often investigates ‘what is perhaps the most interesting
and challenging puzzle in international relations theory – disentangling the
relationship between strategic actors and social/normative inﬂuences’
(Hurd 2008, 310). Over the last two decades, research on norms in IR has
developed several approaches to understanding how, why, and which
norms inﬂuence human actions. The twomajor interrelated research strains
of norms research, which consider the emergence and impact of norms,
respectively, have provided various conceptualizations to explain how
norms matter, such as ‘socialization’ (Risse and Sikkink 1999; Zürn and
Checkel 2005), ‘norm diffusion’ (Acharya 2004), ‘learning and persuasion’




Sikkink 1998). Furthermore, different logics of action, most prominently
the logic of appropriateness (March and Olsen 1989), the logic of arguing
(Risse 2000), the principle of contestedness (Wiener 2007a; Wiener 2014),
and the logic of practicality (Pouliot 2008), discuss whether and how norms
inform actions from diverging epistemological and ontological standpoints.
However, existing research only examines the questions of why actors follow
particular norms and how to understand varying degrees of compliance. In
that, studies tend to overlook how norms are implemented – particularly the
techniques that are used to operationalize norms in practice.
This article considers the question what kind of role the operationaliza-
tion of norms play and how normative substance is constructed in the
process of operationalization. This is particularly relevant in settings where
the decision about which norms should be followed is separate from the
implementation of these norms. The separation of decision-making and
implementation is not only fundamental for theoretical approaches, it is
also practical reality in all forms of complex governing settings. In this
regard, various IR studies are based on a sequential and conceptual–logical
differentiation between decision-makers and norm-implementers. In this
ideal-type understanding, administrative bureaucracies and other imple-
menting agencies are executing clearly deﬁned targets and operationalize
ﬁxed norms. However, what kind of norms do implementers follow and
how is normative meaning translated into practice?
Norms research has only delivered extensive conceptualizations at the
‘front end’ of the underlying analytical and chronological dichotomization
between decisions and actions. In other words, while we know a lot about
the impact mechanisms of norms, abstract norms such as human rights
(HR) or conceptions of democracy – which are codiﬁed in written docu-
ments, reproduced in discourses and expected to shape decisions – are only
given substance in making them administratively operational and imple-
menting them ‘on the ground’. The divergence and convergence of meaning
attributed to such norms has received much attention. However, the
analysis of normative content in IR often focusses on international decision-
making arenas in broad terms, and neglects the possibility that the
operationalization of norms could have transformative effects.1While there
are different ways how norms are made operational, entailing a vast array
of acts, actors and objects, operationalizing norms in the sense of social
sciences involves translating ‘an abstract theoretical concept into something
that can be empirically measured’ (Payne and Payne 2004, 142). This
process entails developing procedures (such as assessments, evaluations,
1 The term decision-making level does not imply that decisions are absent at the local
(implementation) level. It refers to the dominant logical separation in theoretical terms.
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and monitoring processes) to generate comparable and calculable data and
indicators, particularly to gauge the progress in implementation. However,
the act of translating norms into operational concepts transforms (or even
deﬁnes) their substance. These technical processes normally take place
at the administrative level rather than at the decision-making level
and are more inﬂuential than ‘the agency role of norm-takers’ (Acharya
2004, 240) in terms of interpretative ‘localization’.
Yet, what are the effects of such technical procedures, and what does the
operationalization of abstract, universal norms imply in normative-political
terms? This article draws on the Foucauldian theme of governmentality to
analyse techniques used in the ‘daily business’ of global governance. Norms
can be operationalized through constitutional documents and evaluation
guidelines, through standardized procedures or informal ways of doing
things, and are enacted locally in micro-practices. For example, norms
such as gender equality can be made operational by creating quantitative
indicators that measure the number of girls enrolled in primary/secondary
school or by building a teaching facility for female students in rural parts of
sub-Saharan Africa. From this perspective, operationalization refers to the
processes and techniques used in the implementation of norms. Speciﬁcally,
the article focusses on statistical, indicator-based operationalization as an
understudied type of operationalization that is key to the role of norms in
governance approaches.
Studying governing as governmentality, which refers to a complex
arrangement consisting of interacting rationalities and technologies, opens up
new possibilities regarding how techniques such as statistical quantiﬁcation
operationalize supposedly pre-deﬁned norms. The underlying feedback loop
of norm operationalization, which is at the core of the constitutive role of
‘public policy instruments’ (Lascoumes and Le Galès 2007) that give sub-
stance to various norms, provides a concept to accommodate the normativity
of norms that might depart from the initial intentions or objectives of ‘norm-
setters’. The processes examined in this article are based on the assumption
that functional-rational tools do not simply serve to execute political
objectives: techniques produce normative substance that is basically decou-
pled from ideational factors that are ontologically prioritized by many
approaches studying the role of norms. The focus on techniques hence ﬁlls
an important gap in the literature. Overall, the article elaborates on how
normative substance is constructed in the process of operationalization.
The article empirically illustrates this approach by discussing how the
European Union (EU) operationalizes HR. It makes a threefold contribution
to the literature. First, it focusses on the discourse of norms as constitutive and
constituted to address the theoretical blind spot of norms research regarding
how norms are operationalized. Second, it outlines the normative relevance of
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governing techniques. Finally, it emphasizes the importance of considering the
operationalization of norms in practice.
The remainder of the article is organized as follows. The ﬁrst section
discusses the propositions of norms research meant to study the rationality
of actions and the impact of norms. It reviews inﬂuential concepts in IR
research on norms, and sets the scene for the viewpoints delivered by studies
of governmentality presented in this article. The second section introduces a
Foucauldian conceptualization of norms, technologies, and techniques that
are central for governmentality. The ﬁnal section provides empirical
examples of the theoretical discussion by studying how the EU’s HR policy
operationalizes fundamental norms.
Setting the scene: norms, actions, and operationalization
As Finnemore and Sikkink noted in their inﬂuential contribution to the
‘constructivist turn’, ‘[n]orms and normative issues have been central to the
study of politics for at least two millennia’ (1998, 889). But what role do
norms play in the practice of government? Considering this question in the
IR context conventionally starts by deﬁning what norms are before
discussing how they shape decisions. One of the most widely used deﬁni-
tions posits that norms are ‘collective expectations for proper behaviour for
a given identity’ (Jepperson, Wendt, and Katzenstein 1996, 54). While this
understanding is not universally shared, the crucial question is whether the
deﬁnition of norms can be separated from their function or role. Theories of
action address this point: the ‘logic of appropriateness’ (March and Olsen
1989) as an important norm-following approach conceptualizes ‘rules of
appropriateness’ as ‘embodied in the foundational norms of contemporary
democracies’ (March and Olsen 2004, 6). Challenging this view and
‘the stable quality of norms or the facticity dimension as the make or break
point for the power of norms, establishing whether norms are followed by a
group of actors who consider them as either appropriate or legitimate’
(Wiener 2007b, 54), the logic of arguing (see Risse 2000) and the principle
of contestedness (Wiener 2007b, 2008) ontologically prioritize the com-
municative–discursive dimension. The logic of arguing suggests that actors
in international negotiations are not always certain which norm should be
appropriately followed, and they are involved in deliberations about the
contextual relevance of speciﬁc norms. This points to the tension between
the facticity of norms as existing standards and their validity across differ-
ent contexts deriving of Habermasian theory. The basic assumption is that
legal structures are constitutive of abstract and positive rights, which makes
laws the subject of interpretation according to factual historical conditions.
With this in mind, Wiener (2007a, 8) argues that the meaning of
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‘fundamental norms’, such as HR, democracy, sovereignty, and the rule of
law, which are the type of political norms most IR studies refer to, are
contested by default. Therefore she introduces a typology of norms that
differentiates ‘fundamental norms’ from ‘organizing principles’ such as
accountability, transparency, and ﬂexibility and from ‘standardized pro-
cedures’ such as qualiﬁed majority voting, unanimous decisions, and pro-
portional representation (Wiener 2007a, 8).
Acknowledging the ‘dual quality of norms’ (Wiener 2007b) as con-
stitutive and constituted in the tradition of structuration theory in IR
(Wendt 1987) has contributed to reﬁning perspectives on norms in IR. The
categorization and ultimate deﬁnition of norms intensify an analytical
fragmentation that prioritizes the construction and stabilization of meaning
at speciﬁc points in time though. Furthermore, the question is not only
whether and what kinds of effects different types of norms have, but also
how these norms relate to each other. Are fundamental norms to be con-
ceptualized separately from organizing principles and standardized proce-
dures when studying their emergence and effect? How does the operational
implementation of norms play into this?
These highly inﬂuential concepts of norms in IR discussed thus far assume a
more or less stable normative structure. The deliberation or contestation, and
reinterpretation of meaning presupposes a reﬂective process inherent to actors
who basically consider what norms mean to them.Moreover, norms research
privileges a particular concept of disagreement which is based on the
assumption that actors follow different norms and seek to promote their own
understanding of normative meaning. While this is certainly the case to some
extent, it is largely unconsidered that basic techniques to implement norms are
rarely subject to reﬂective deliberation, contested by default, or external to the
supposed processes of social norm construction.
In a similar vein, the Bourdieuan-inspired logic of practicality criticizes
popular approaches for their exclusive focus on reﬂective, deliberative
processes. Proponents of this logic argue that actions are not always
the outcome of profound reﬂections on the appropriateness and meaning of
norms; instead, ‘practical’ or ‘background knowledge’ (Pouliot 2008, 258)
informs common sense ways of proceeding. This focus on how ideas and
practices relate is an important contribution of the logic of practicality:
theoretical perspectives emphasizing the co-constitution of structure and
agency, inherent to the previously discussed social constructivist approaches,
and logics of action, fail in this regard. Thus, actors follow a sequential logic in
which knowledge constitutes the rationale for actions.
However, if we understand ‘practical knowledge as unreﬂexive and
inarticulate through and through’ (Pouliot 2008, 265), how does knowl-
edge come into play in the operationalization phase, which is associated
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with much longer time frames? Operationalizing political decisions, such as
those taken by complex, multi-layer organizations like the EU, is different
from the intuitive reactions of a football goalkeeper attempting to save a
penalty, to refer to a common example of Bourdieuan practice theory.2 The
posited ‘ontological priority of the logic of practicality’ (Pouliot 2008, 270)
reproduces a central (but widely neglected) problem of action theories and
norms research in simply stating that ‘[p]ractices translate structural
background intersubjective knowledge into intentional acts’ (Adler and
Pouliot 2011, 16).
Recent contributions discussing the merits of actor–network theory (ANT)
(Barry 2013; Best and Walters 2013a, 2013b; Nexon and Pouliot 2013;
Bueger and Bethke 2014) have reconsidered the question of ‘translation’ (see
Rose and Miller 1992, 184) in the context of IR scholarship. Their main
assumption is that ‘[t]ranslation is a process of replication or imitation and
differentiation at the same time’ (Barry 2013, 415). Broadly, ANT shares an
interest with the ‘material turn’ and the ‘new materialism’, which is also
contextualized in governmentality studies (Lemke 2015; Lundborg and
Vaughan-Williams 2015), in ‘the materiality of knowledge production’ (Best
andWalters 2013b, 347) and in the usage of technical devices or machines to
translate social reality into comparable and accessible data. While this phe-
nomenon of translation in networks, which entails a common language of
indicators and similar constructs harmonizing concepts of global governance,
for instance, offers important viewpoints on the transition of knowledge in the
micro-practices of administrative–technical operationalization, the actual
normative reconstruction remains unconsidered. The intended or unintended
transformations and mistakes made when translating meaning across condi-
tions, cultures, and languages is signiﬁcant (see Apter 2001), but translation
works in two directions: for example, the economic situation of a country is
assessed and translated into indicators such as GDP growth and inﬂation
rates, while macro-concepts, micro-standards, and political norms also feed-
back to the initial programme during the operationalization process. This
points to the transformative quality of operationalization.
The feedback loop of normative substance emerging here contests
the assumption that norms are only constituted and constitutive at the
decision-making level. I argue that it is important not simply to reverse the
2 This critique has not gone unnoticed by sociologists working with Bourdieuan concepts:
Lahire has, for example, noted how Bourdieu’s reﬂexive, practical logic of action privileges a
particular type of social situation: one that necessitates reﬂexive behaviour at the expense of other
types of social situations that require the reﬂective engagement of actors with longer time frames.
However, Bourdieuan-inspired practice theory in IR has not yet accommodated this critique
(see Lahire 1998; Bode 2015, 39).
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sequence of decisions followed by actions, but to investigate how techni-
ques are applied as part of programmes that are in turn redeﬁned by the
substance produced through techniques. This circuit of normativity is
related to two crucial questions: where does the actual substance of norms
originate and how does (legal or statistical) normality refer to normativity?
The assumption that normative substance is derived from a narrowly
deﬁned conception of law in the sense of codiﬁed rules is just as
unsatisfactory (see Finnemore and Toope 2001, 746–47) as analysing only
the ideational–discursive part of decision-making, while neglecting the back
end of the action process in terms of operationalization.
In sum, norms research either (1) overemphasizes the importance of
deliberations and decision-making in deﬁning norms at the expense of nor-
mative substance in practice (logic of appropriateness, logic of arguing,
principle of contestedness), or (2) disregards the tension between decision and
implementation by classifying norms as diffuse background knowledge and
ignoring their technical operationalization (logic of practicality). In contrast to
the extensive academic elaboration on the ideational processes of norm
socialization, internalization, diffusion, and compliance (e.g. Archibugi 1992;
Schimmelfennig 2000; Börzel and Risse 2012; Börzel and Solingen 2014), my
perspective on the operationalization of norms assumes that norms are not
ﬁxed and simply put into practice; acts of governing are always based on
certain techniques that have a constitutive effect. In other words, the decisive
question is what happens to norms after decisions have been made, which
requires thinking beyond the ideal-type decision-making arena that is
conceptualized as prior to the executive, administrative dimensions. In that,
I argue that the meaning of norms is deﬁned and constructed in the
operationalization process. As aforementioned, there are different types of
operationalization – the measurement of fundamental rights through indica-
tors, the judicial interpretation of legal norms, or the fusion of global HR and
local norms in ﬁeldwork contexts that creates novel standards of appro-
priateness. While these processes are complex and require extensive in-depth
analyses, it is apparent how considering the operationalization of norms
contributes to an understanding of their meaning and function.
The following section on the study of governmentality offers novel
viewpoints on the construction of norms and on how indicators as central
element of one type of operationalization are important for the role of
norms in the practice of global governing.
Governmentality and the role of norms
In his lecture series on governmentality, which is deﬁned as ‘the ensemble
formed by institutions, procedures, analyses and reﬂections, calculations,
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and tactics that allow the exercise of this very speciﬁc, albeit very complex,
power that has the population as its target, political economy as its major
form of knowledge, and apparatuses of security as its essential technical
instrument’ (Foucault 2007, 108); Foucault describes three mechanisms of
conduct that emerge in the historical development of government and are
important for understanding the role of norms: the legal prohibition, the
disciplinary prescription, and the normalization by security apparatuses.
Foucault considers the differences between the effects of the law, the dis-
cipline, and security, respectively, from the viewpoint of normalization as
an ill-deﬁned and vague concept that is, however, crucial for the way norms
matter. First, he argues that there is a ‘normativity intrinsic to the law’
(Foucault 2007, 56) but this normativity is not necessarily translated from
norms or part of a process that deﬁnes what norms are. He notes that:
[I]f it is true that the law refers to a norm, and that the role and function of
the law therefore – the very operation of the law – is to codify a norm, to
carry out a codiﬁcation in relation to the norm, the problem that I am trying
to mark out is how techniques of normalization develop from and below the
system of law, in its margins and maybe even against it (Foucault 2007, 56).
The prohibitive mechanism of law works ‘in the imaginary’ (Foucault
2007, 47) to deﬁne a priori, on the basis of ﬁxed rules, what is the permitted
normality (i.e. everything that is not prohibited is allowed).3 In contrast,
disciplinary mechanisms determine the limits of appropriate behaviour
(i.e. complying involves acting only within the prescribed parameters). In
this regard, Foucault distinguishes between two processes, normation and
normalization:
Disciplinary normalization consists ﬁrst of all in positing a model, an
optimal model that is constructed in terms of a certain result, and the
operation of disciplinary normalization consists in trying to get people,
movements, and actions to conform to this model, the normal that which
is incapable of conforming to the norm. In other words, it is not the
normal and the abnormal that is fundamental and primary in disciplinary
normalization, it is the norm. I would rather say that what is involved in
disciplinary techniques is a normation (normation) rather than a nor-
malization (Foucault 2007, 57).
Disciplinary technologies are based on certain ideal-type norms as pre-
deﬁned standards, which serve as benchmarks of a disciplinary process.
Foucault ‘realizes that law and discipline have a common starting
3 See also Macherey’s (1991) differentiation between juridical-negative and biological-
positive models of norms.
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point: neither is based on the descriptive normal but on a prescriptive norm’
(Lemke 1997, 190, author’s translation). This leads Foucault to con-
ceptualize the process of normalization to deﬁne what constitutes the
(average) normal. Normalization is conducted by ‘apparatuses of security’,
technologies, and governing techniques that use statistical methods
to measure the ‘normal distribution’ of various indicators of population
control. Foucault elaborates that:
In the disciplines, one started from the norm, and it was in relation to the
training carried out with reference to the norm that the normal could
be distinguished from the abnormal. Here, instead, we have a plotting of
the normal and the abnormal, of different curves of normality, and the
operation of normalization consists in establishing an interplay between
these different distributions of normality (…) These distributions will
serve as the norm (Foucault 2007, 63).
Therefore, normalization refers to a process in which norms are con-
structed as products of perceived distributions of the statistical, average
normal. Normalization creates perceptions of ‘normal’, which create a
benchmark that can be used to assess whether certain actors are performing
better or worse. Normation, in contrast, is the process through which
existing and ﬁxed norms work as standards of conditionality and com-
pliance. This introduces a concept of norms that locates them outside of the
stable, ideational, pre-action level. In this alternative view, norms emerge
and change in practical contexts; their substance is produced by techniques
but they are not deﬁned prior to actions.
Foucault referred in this segment of his lectures to the speciﬁc, historical
emergence of calculative, statistical techniques that established a sense of
the ‘average normal’ in the 18th century. If we reconsider contemporary
research on norms in this context, it is apparent that the predominant
conceptual perspective is based on the model of disciplinary, prescriptive
regulation in the broad sense. Although there is a conceptual accom-
modation of the ﬂexible, constitutive, and constituted qualities of norms,
the prevailing approach prioritizes ﬁxing normative meaning at the
decision-making level, and ignores the operationalization of norms. This
theoretical problem is particularly relevant in settings where decisions
about (normative) objectives or programmes are made separately from the
operationalization of these decisions – such as by governments, inter- and
supra-national organizations, which entail different layers of decision-
making and implementation.
In particular, the Foucauldian perspective draws attention to how the
substance of norms emerges in measuring the population. Before his
governmentality lectures, Foucault introduced the notion of ‘bio-power’
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(Foucault 1990, 140), which is manifested in ‘the disciplines of the body
and the regulations of the population’ (Foucault 1990, 139). This is
important insofar as the viewpoint is redirected from the level of individuals
(bodies) to the entire population. Although it is rarely considered in more
detail, social constructivist mechanisms such as persuasion, socialization,
and diffusion theoretically conceptualize the effects of norms on indivi-
duals. This implies that actors either accept or reject speciﬁc normative
meanings, but neglects conceptualizing transformative feedback from
actors to an assumed normative structure. The statistical measurement and
subsequent normalization of what is considered ‘normality’ or ‘average
normal’ establishes the norm in concrete administrative practices – for
example, the design and application of indicators. Then the data are
‘re-translated’ to the initial norm-setting (decision-making) level. It is
apparent how the average IQ of students, GDP growth or mortality rate can
serve as benchmarks of societal normality providing indicators of an opti-
mum, but how are political norms operationalized in this regard? Are
indicators simply replacing political processes of norm creation?
Foucault did not explicitly address the operationalization of pre-existing
norms in conceptualizing the three mechanisms of prohibition, prescription
(normation), and normalization mentioned above. Instead, he maintains a
de facto dichotomy of legal, disciplinary normation, and normalization
through ‘statistical instruments’ (Foucault 2007, 58) in his governmentality
lectures. However, political or social norms that would be considered dis-
ciplinary standards of appropriateness are also operationalized on the basis
of statistical assessments that supply the administratively necessary data
with which to measure success and failure.
Based on the above discussion, I argue that the (statistical) normal, which is
taken as relevant normative substance, is produced in technical processes and
normalizes what norms mean in practice. Translating fundamental norms,
such as HR, into operational indicators might only deﬁne these norms based
on what is countable and processable. Taking the ‘translatability’ (Rose and
Miller 2010, 280) of rationality, which denotes the ideational construction of
the ways and objectives of government (Merlingen 2006, 22; Rose and
Miller 2008, 29; see Gordon 1991, 3), and the process of operationalization
seriously, however, implies considering to what extent a reformulation, trans-
formation, or even (re-)construction of norms takes place. Further, it should be
studied what kind of role-speciﬁc technologies and techniques play here. This is
also relevant for understanding the relationship between rationality and tech-
nology, particularly with regard to the assumption that stable technologies and
techniques produce rationalities that is central to my argument.
In this regard, operationalizing norms means recurring on a set of dif-
ferent technologies and techniques of governmentality, examples of which
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are addressed in the relevant literature (Miller and Rose 1990; Dean 1999;
Haahr 2004; Walters 2004; Triantaﬁllou 2007; Rose and Miller 2008;
Collier 2009). The deﬁnitions of (and differences between) technology and
technique are rarely made explicit, however, and Foucault used these terms
in a rather elusive manner. I consider techniques to be integral parts of
technologies, representing macro tools of governing such as reporting,
assessments, and evaluations.4 Equally, there is a plethora of techniques
that constitute technologies of governing. Considering the limitations of
this article, I will mainly focus on operationalization through indicators,
representing the techniques of quantiﬁcation and calculation (see Merry
andWood 2015), which are salient parts of global governance’s ‘governing
by numbers’ (Miller 2001). A clear deﬁnition or even limitation of what
technologies and techniques are is, however, counterproductive. In
contrast, it is more important to analyse how they work in the practice of
governing. The next section considers the role of indicators in the
operationalization of norms in more detail.
Operationalization and indicators
In the context of norms research, my understanding of operationalization
assumes that normative objectives are not simply implemented in a neutral
fashion using a set of default techniques (see Lascoumes and Le Galès
2007, 3). Instead, techniques, such as statistical methods to quantify social
phenomena, produce normative substance; they deﬁne problems but also
offer solutions, at least implicitly. In other words, a technology’s ‘properties
are indissociable from the aims attributed to it’ (Lascoumes and Le Galès
2007, 6). Techniques are vested with normative baggage that stems from
the programmatic purpose they were created for. However, in contrast to
the position ‘that every public policy instrument constitutes a condensed
and ﬁnalized form of knowledge’ (Lascoumes and Le Galès 2007, 11),
I emphasize the constitutive role of technologies and techniques that is not
ﬁxed a priori, which also renders it necessary to specify the role of norms.
Technologies and techniques are therefore developed in certain contexts
and for speciﬁc purposes, but they are not normatively programmed to
simply translate scripts into practice. Rather, instruments produce norma-
tive substance aggregated by a constant stream of social data emanating
from measuring processes.
How, for example, do political norms matter when countries’ conditions
and situations are assessed along economic, political, and social dimen-
sions? Regardless of whether actors share a common normative
4 A further discussion of this aspect is theoretically interesting but not central for this article.
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understanding of what democracy means, for instance, the techniques used
to evaluate, report, and monitor the quality of democracy or governance
are largely homogenous. This is at the core of the ‘comparative turn’
(Martens 2007), pointing to the importance of a limited number of indi-
cators that key international actors share. The construction of these indi-
cators is vital for how norms and objectives are operationalized. Moreover,
the processes of data collection used to develop statistical understandings of
normality (as normal distribution) produce a particular deﬁnition of norms.
In this regard, conceptualizations of socialization processes such as the
‘the norm life cycle’ (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998, 895–96) or the ‘spiral
model of human rights change’ (Risse, Ropp, and Sikkink 1999, 20)
that provide inﬂuential ideas on the impact of HR norms ignore that the
operationalization of norms might produce a very different normativity to
the one initially ascribed. The intentions of ‘norm entrepreneurs’ ‘interested
in changing social norms’ (Sunstein 1996, 909; see Finnemore and Sikkink
1998) could therefore not only be lost but also transformed during trans-
lation. In addition, these studies overemphasize the independent character
of the internalization process that only requires initial persuasion and
acceptance to result in a desirable outcome by default. However, ‘the
government of oneself’ (Foucault 2007, 88) based on ‘action at a distance’
(Rose and Miller 2010, 278) in the Foucauldian sense necessitates constant
monitoring and evaluation.
The process of operationalization, in which normative substance is con-
structed as functional information (i.e. statistical distributions deﬁning the
average normal), works in the direction of fundamental norms and not vice
versa. Therefore, no ﬁxed optimal model is used to assess the conditions to
which populations should conform. Rather, certain ﬁndings are presented
as more or less favourable depending on the degree of deviation from the
average normal. This is what Foucault considers to be normalization in the
strict sense.
To give an example, how does the operationalization of an abstract poli-
tical objective such as ‘good education’work in this regard? The ‘Programme
for International Student Assessment’ (PISA), conducted by the OECD since
2000, is based on previous OECD initiatives aimed at ‘measuring knowledge’
in the context of the proclaimed ‘knowledge-based economy’, which is
supposed to strategically link information, education, and knowledge as
exploitable resources to promote economic growth and ‘maximize perfor-
mance’ (OECD 1996, 7–8). The PISA test scores, scaled according to the
‘RaschModel of ItemResponse Theory’, cover 70 ‘economies’ to date and are
only meaningful on a comparative and competitive basis. The rationale is that
scaled scores set the OECD average score at 500 with a std. dev. of 100. The
results are visualized in tables for each testing area (maths, science, reading)
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and presented as country rankings (OECD2015). PISA demonstrates how the
uncontested fundamental norm of good education, shared by stakeholders in
the decision-making process, is constructed and speciﬁed in the implementa-
tion phase. In other words, the techniques used to operationalize the norm
of ‘good education’, represented by assessing performance as part of
implementing reforms, produce a normativity that is translated into
functional terms. The substance of good education is identiﬁed using the
average normal distribution, which is simply a score of 500. This number, and
its monitoring process, turns into the ‘make it and break it’ point of what is
considered as favourable educational policy without providing contextual
substance or case-to-case differentiation.
Yet, the operationalization of education in terms of measurement is often
provided by specialized institutions that are neither formal part of domestic
politics nor involved in implementing policies but still normalize rational-
ities. According to a European Commission representative: ‘50–60% of the
data for the EU’s indicators report for the Lisbon strategy are from the
OECD (…) because at the EU level it would cost too much money to
develop such instruments like PISA’ (cited in Grek 2009, 32). The practice
of country reporting produces indicators that display statistical variance
but do not result in policies that differ fundamentally, are ‘tailor-made’ or
based on ‘joint ownership’, to use some global governance keywords. Calls
for ‘modernization’, ‘democratization’, ‘liberalization’, or ‘development’
are made on the grounds of perceptions of statistical normality largely
derived from conditions in western or highly developed industrialized
states. When it comes to implementing policy programmes that are
supposed to promote necessary reforms to create these conditions, the
question is not whether there are shared interpretations of fundamental
political norms, but what the ‘indicatorisation’ (Crothers 2006) of their
economic, social, and political dimensions means for normative governance
(see Merry 2011).
How do GDP growth, the rate of school enrolment or per capita income, to
name a few popular indicators, relate to normative objectives? Governing
by numbers is an important characteristic of global governance that
aims to transform societies (see Rose 1999; Merry 2011; Hansen and
Mühlen-Schulte 2012, 197). This approach uses indicators to justify
reforms and to serve as the basis of rigorous monitoring practices. In other
words, governing by means of quantiﬁcations also denotes a governing of
numbers – assessing success and failure becomes a numerical comparison
and political responses are focussed on changing numeric indicators. At the
very least, this entails the intrinsic risk of perceiving only those problems
and solutions that fall into the narrow scope of what is statistically
displayed. The feedback of supposedly normatively neutral and exact
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numeric indicators to the decision-making level contributes to naturalizing
requirements, needs and conditions thereby purporting unquestioned
truths about how to handle issues. The ‘problematization (…) that intro-
duces something into the play of true and false and constitutes it as an
object for thought’ (Foucault 1999, 257) is inherently linked to a limited
range of seemingly inevitable responses. In other words, the ‘problem’ is
perceived from the end of techniques in the ﬁrst place. This also implies that
programmatic solutions, such as the shorthand response of privatization in
development cooperation, only allow those particular problems to occur
that are inherent to their perceptual limits of measurement.My point is here
not to argue for the general irrelevance of indicators. Rather, I emphasize
the normative implications of technical processes that are widely perceived
as neutral operationalization devices.
Scholarship on neoliberal governmentality criticizes how quantitative
methods economize the political dimension and thereby manage popula-
tions based on the paradigm of optimized performance. Gane argues, for
instance, that the neoliberal ‘marketization of the state’ is ‘about interven-
tion and regulation with the aim of injecting market principles of compe-
tition into all forms of social and cultural life’ (Gane 2012, 630–31). The
crucial transition from liberal to neoliberal technologies does therefore not
primarily concern the assumed retreat of the state based on deregulation
and privatization, but is rather designed to implement principles of
competition and evaluation in political, public domains such as education
and health systems. Here, the process termed ‘the “governmentalization” of
the state’ (Foucault 2008, 109) provides for an important connotation,
particularly with respect to the global level: the expansion of governmental
interventions, initiated by actors of global governance, does not lead to the
worldwide spread of a very speciﬁc normative meaning but to the global
dissemination of a certain administrative order. This model and its relevant
technologies result from incorporating economic-administrative principles
and methods into the political dimension.
However, normativity and the political act do not disappear, contrary to
what the ‘marketization’ or neoliberalization of global affairs understood
as explicitly apolitical processes suggest. In fact, while the intensiﬁcation of
economic transactions and the harmonization of relevant procedures and
standards are certainly key aspects of the idea of globalization, the world-
wide proliferation, codiﬁcation, and institutionalization of ‘universal’
norms deepens at the same time. In this regard, it is important to consider
how neoliberal technologies and the alleged promotion of fundamental
norms in global governance are combined. The logic of functionality that
appears in the disguise of ‘indicatorizing’ governing programmes manifests
itself in homogeneous technical approaches. Furthermore, the rationality of
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the governance toolbox deﬁnes what kinds of problems are perceived in the
ﬁrst place. The appropriateness, legitimacy, or contestation of normative
meaning becomes irrelevant – diverging understandings of democracy
are not important if procedures for measuring, quantifying, and ranking the
quality of democratization have the same shape and funding guidelines only
match up with these instruments.
The literature on indicators and governmentality has provided for
signiﬁcant insights into the relation of power and knowledge in the ﬁeld
of ‘technical’ governance (e.g. Löwenheim 2008; Busse 2015). However,
a research gap remains: how do indicators relate to norms that are widely
conceptualized as pre-existing normative standards of governing?
If indicators are the decisive link between decision-making and imple-
mentation, this question becomes even more important. The following
section illustrates the operationalization of fundamental norms using the
EU’s HR policy as an example. While this section cannot provide a nuanced
analysis of the EU’s HR instruments such as the ‘European Instrument
for Democracy and Human Rights’ (EIDHR), the objective is to give
an overview of how the practice of operational translation unfolds as well
as to highlight its normative implications. In that, the following section is
also meant to encourage further comparative and more detailed studies of
HR instruments and other technologies and techniques in global govern-
ance to understand the role of (fundamental) norms in implementation
practices.
Operationalizing HR: the indicatorization of fundamental norms
The promotion and defence of HR is at the heart of political ‘good gov-
ernance’. Key institutions and organizations such as the EU or the United
Nations (UN) emphasize the importance of promoting HR when it comes
to development cooperation or external relations. HR in terms of
political conditionality that deﬁnes speciﬁc requirements, demands, and
expectations in return for ﬁnancial–economic opportunities therefore
occupy a central position in external governance models. How are HR
operationalized technically? Generally, the operationalization of these
‘fundamental norms’ is based on constructing indicators, measuring the
performance of speciﬁc actions supposed to promote HR. As noted before,
indicators comprise compressed data as representations of social pheno-
mena that are not directly measurable. Abstract norms such as HR are
therefore operationalized as the aggregate of certain conditions, such as the
absence of torture, school enrolment rates of girls, or free elections.
Furthermore, indicators can represent a process or an outcome, depending
on whether they are supposed to measure a development or a result.
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As in the case of different types of operationalization, indicators are
designed for different purposes. For example, Raworth (2001, 111) differ-
entiates between quantitative and qualitative indicators in that the former
provide numeric information, while the latter imply judgements. This
suggests a procedural deﬁnition and dichotomization of measurement
and monitoring: ‘[w]hile the outcome of monitoring is a judgement, the
outcome of measurement is not’ (Starl et al. 2014, 17). However, this
distinction reproduces techniques of quantiﬁcation as part of neutral
operations. Creating indicators, the process of monitoring itself as well as
deciding what counts also contains judgements. This reﬂects the general
argument that operationalization is basically an interpretative action,
regardless of whether it comprises indicators or not. To come back to HR,
applying indicators in the sense of numerical data used in statistics repre-
sents this ideal of objective measurement that allows for quantifying,
calculating, and comparing results. This approach to HR is reﬂected in the
widespread usage of the ‘enjoyment’ concept that assesses the degree to
which speciﬁc rights are ‘enjoyed’ by the population (Raworth 2001, 119).
It comes close to the predominant focus of development cooperation
evaluations on social-economic conditions such as unemployment rates,
literacy rates, life expectancy, or rates of inﬂation that are criticized for
comparing societal development and performances without considering
differences in the capacity of countries (McInerney-Lankford and
Otto-Sano 2010, 19). While the possible divergence between abstract HR
and indicators is evident in terms of the normative meaning that emerges at
different points, the function of HR indicators as part of operationalization
requires additional scrutiny.
Indicatorizing HR
The EU is one of the major global actors involved in promoting HR
and democracy. The Treaty on European Union (TEU) states in Article 21,
2 that
the Union’s action on the international scene shall be guided by the prin-
ciples which have inspired its own creation, development and enlargement
and which it seeks to advance in the wider world: democracy, the rule of
law, the universality and indivisibility of human rights and fundamental
freedoms, respect for human dignity, the principles of equality and
solidarity and respect for the principles of the United Nations Charter and
international law (European Union 2012).
These normative objectives are not only anchored in the TEU, but are
also reproduced as key elements of the EU’s discourse on normative legiti-
macy in its external actions. In 2012, the ‘EU Strategic Framework and
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Action Plan on Human Rights and Democracy’ (11855/12) was adopted,
which provides for the ﬁrst common EU framework document to coordinate
and streamline its approach to HR.Here, the EU declares that it is determined
to ‘promote human rights in all areas of its external action without exception’
(Council of the European Union 2012, 2). This objective lead, inter alia, to
adopting ﬁnancial instruments, such as the EIDHR in 2006. For the initial
period of 2007–2013, the EIDHR’s budget was €1.104 billion (European
Commission 2015c), comprising €1.332 billion for the 2014–2020 period
(European External Action Service 2014, 24). The EU’s HR policy is therefore
implemented by substantial funding instruments, which require an oper-
ationalization of norms not least to comply with existing evaluation proce-
dures. Basically, this bureaucratic demand for HR indicators originates in the
administrative processes for allocating funding and assessing/evaluating the
performance of allocated means. This is also linked to the structural separa-
tion of funder and implementer, with the former often holding a superior
position as knowledge-provider and agenda-setter.However, regardless of the
HR conception of the funder, what HR promotion is and how to understand
HR emerges in the operationalization process.
For example, under the leadership of EU delegations in speciﬁc countries,
grants funded by the EIDHR are allocated ‘through competitive calls for
proposals’ (European Commission 2015b). The EIDHR allocation practice
not only requires data for kick-starting the initial funding process but also
in the evaluation phase. The EIDHR will undergo a mid-term review in
2017 and the report to be released ‘will focus on the achievement of the
EIDHR objectives by assessing indicators measuring the results delivered
and the EIDHR’s efﬁciency’ (European Commission 2015b). For this pur-
pose, the EIDHR comprises ﬁve objectives: support to HR and HR defen-
ders; support to other EU HR priorities; support to democracy; EU election
observation; support to targeted key actors and processes, including inter-
national and regional HR instruments, and mechanisms; and support
measures and unallocated reserve (European Commission 2015b). The
annex of the ‘Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights Worldwide
Multiannual Indicative Programme (2014–2017)’ document lists several
indicators for each objective and partly addresses how results shall be
evaluated by using external sources such as data provided by the UN’s
Ofﬁce of the High Commissioner for Human Rights. The EU almost
exclusively focusses on numerically processed outcomes. For example, the
‘number of advocacy, awareness raising, and capacity building activities
supported’, the ‘average time it takes to process requests for emergency
support’, or the ‘number of Human Rights Defenders (individual) being
protected’ are taken as baselines for constructing evaluation indicators
(European External Action Service 2014, 26).
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This quantitative technique matches with existing approaches to
evaluation, accountability, and administrative efﬁciency. However, the
indicators mentioned above fail to provide deeper insights into the proce-
dural dimension of HR promotion apart from delivering snapshots of a
numerically measured situation at a speciﬁc point in time. First, the sub-
stance of HR is constructed as an active dimension. This means that the
evaluation technique is not based on a deﬁnitive, explicit understanding of
what HR are. Instead, the amount or efﬁciency of HR actions serve as
proxies for more or less favourable situations. Second, measuring such
numbers allows for determining a normal distribution of HR, for example,
for development countries, and to compare it with the statistical normality
of EU members. A normalization in this sense would then entail activities
aimed at bringing the former normality in line with the latter. However, this
is not the case. In other words, the EU’s approach to making HR opera-
tional at this stage is not based on ﬁxed norms used as benchmarks to assess
against a HR optimum, as it is the case with disciplinary measures. At the
same time, the process of normalization that forms part of the logic of
operationalizing HR is not systematically applied. This is noteworthy
because it points to a theoretical and a practical problem: theoretically, the
EU’s fundamental or constitutional political norms, enshrined in Article 21
of the TEU, are therefore reconstructed in terms of different but largely
random proxy indicators. The normative substance emerging here is hence
vague and not clearly linked to this speciﬁc set of fundamental norms. This
challenges theoretical concepts using these fundamental norms as an ana-
lytical starting point to judge whether HR are promoted successfully or not.
The practical problem concerns the operationalization of HR by providing
insights into how a situation compares to another, while clear concepts of
optimal conditions and situations are lacking. The ambivalence that is a
central feature of judgements contradicts the need of ﬁxed evaluation
standards, which the EU’s approach actually requires and the dominant
understanding of fundamental norms in IR implies.
Considering the quantiﬁcation of ‘human rights defenders’, it is unclear
whether a higher number of protected ‘defenders’ constitutes a failure
or a success of EU policy. Was the situation of HR defenders enhanced or
exacerbated through the EU’s action? Furthermore, only elaborate and
detailed qualitative studies of individual cases could provide for informa-
tion on the impact of a speciﬁc action. In fact, there is evidence that the
intervention of western states in terms of political–economic pressure, the
funding of activities, or media attention can create a backlash on HR actors
in certain situations (see Bukovská 2008; Terman 2013). Apart from the
methodological and conceptual problems that emerge when designing
indicators to measure social phenomena, such as the fact that most
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HR indicators fail to measure the intensity and quality of violations
(see Landman 2004), a related but more basic challenge concerns the
operationalization of universal norms.
The impossibility of universality and the inevitability of normativity
The EU’s 2012 Strategic Framework document declares ‘promoting the
universality of human rights’ to be one of the central objectives of its HR
policy. It states that ‘[t]he EU will speak out against any attempt to under-
mine respect for the universality of human rights’ (Council of the European
Union 2012, 2). While this position is certainly in line with the mainstream
international legal framework as well as democratic practices and mirrors
the logic associated with the role of fundamental norms, how can the
assumed universal normativity be operationalized in order to translate it
accurately (see Raworth 2001, 118; O’Neill 2005; Merry and Wood 2015,
206)? Indicators are neither universally applicable nor are they capable of
reproducing social processes in their totality. Moreover, there are no uni-
versally accepted standards (and thereby no speciﬁc normativity) that
would deﬁne what kind of indicators are suitable for measuring HR. While
there is a tendency to recur to similar indicators, establishing a global
standard of measurement, the actual operationalization is at the discretion
of administrative procedures performed by a limited number of actors. The
resulting broad interpretation of what the substance of HR is might or
might not match the intentions of those having decided on a political pro-
gramme in the ﬁrst place.
Indicators not only produce normative substance by deﬁning speciﬁc
aspects as relevant for HR, they also set limits as to what is perceivable in
the ﬁrst place. In other words, ‘to make something known it must be
countable, but if it has not already been translated into commensurable and
quantiﬁable terms, it is difﬁcult to count and may remain unnoticed
and uncounted’ (Merry andWood 2015, 205). The increasing need for data
and the streamlining of governance models that rely heavily on indicators,
preferably quantitative ones, has not least lead to an increased dependence
on the availability of data. Therefore, it matters not only whether initial
intentions can be adequately translated by indicators but also what kind
of scenarios indicators construct, considering that less developed countries
often lack the capacities or willingness to provide the required amount
and quality of data necessary for this system of governmentality (see
Jerven 2012).
Politicized information, such as HR data, depends on available, objective
sources, and material. But what kind of knowledge do actors such as
the European Commission or the European External Action Service use?
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The EU’s monitoring and evaluation material (in the form of Progress
Reports) rarely provides insights into how the processed information was
acquired. Occasionally, there are references to secondary knowledge
providers such as the OECD, the World Bank, and non-governmental
actors such as Amnesty International, Freedom House, or Transparency
International. The Freedom House index, for example, works with two
simple numerical ratings for each country, from one to seven for political
rights and civil liberties, with one representing the freest and seven the least
free. While a diversiﬁcation of sources is certainly required to obtain a
broader range of data, the EU fails to problematize whether the substance
of HR promotion matches with the HR understanding of these sources.
This is not visible by considering HR on a scale from one to seven. In
adopting existing standards, the EU therefore also, by default, accepts the
problem–solution concept that is implicit in the decisions of what and how
to measure, a decision that the Union has not made by itself.
If, for instance, the substance of equality is constructed based on indi-
cators that calculate the average numbers of educational degrees, of sexual
harassment, of psychosocial health consultations, of the average income,
employment rates, or of numbers of perceived pregnancy discrimination,
equality is identiﬁed by way of the average normal distribution, which
consists of speciﬁc scores in numeric terms. Whether country situations in
terms of equality can be considered normatively ‘good’ is then judged on the
basis of national and global comparative rankings that display favourable
or unfavourable performances. The operationalization of HR in the way
described is based on default approaches of measurement accepted as
appropriate. This ascribes techniques a substantial role in deﬁning the
substance of norms. However, the feedback loop that connects the
operationalization sphere with other levels of norm construction or delibe-
ration is also subject to the political processing of this substance. To put
it differently, norms might be interpreted in speciﬁc terms in the
operationalization process; this interpretation, however, does not ulti-
mately stabilize meaning but is again transformed in a process that politi-
cizes measurement.
The politicization of measurement
In the previous sections, I have argued for focussing on whether and how
normative substance emerges in the ‘technical’ operationalization of HR.
While the importance of considering the constructedness of norms on this
level is apparent, the implications of this process emerge out of different
layers of politicization. Although techniques hold an inﬂuential structuring
position in my concept of governmentality, the role of indicators is also part
400 HENDR IK HUEL S S
WHUPVRIXVHDYDLODEOHDWKWWSVZZZFDPEULGJHRUJFRUHWHUPVKWWSVGRLRUJ6
'RZQORDGHGIURPKWWSVZZZFDPEULGJHRUJFRUH,3DGGUHVVRQ2FWDWVXEMHFWWRWKH&DPEULGJH&RUH
of political agency. Even if indicators provide for speciﬁc constructions of
normative substance, the inclusion of this meaning in decision-making
procedures is a political act. The interpretative feedback of indicators as the
substance of fundamental norms in this type of operationalization depends
on the technical but also on the judgemental processing that occurs in
monitoring activities. How indicators inform norms is partly shaped by the
speciﬁc programme they are meant to operationalize. This points to the
hybrid function of indicators linking decision and implementation through
operationalization. Normalizing perceptions takes place in assessment
procedures applying a range of standard indicators that focus on the
pre-deﬁned average as the desirable normality. However, this is not neces-
sarily an unreﬂective act, but often part of the politics of measurement.
Abstract norms such as HR require some form of operationalization
to give them practical relevance. The decision to operationalize and tomeasure
qualitative phenomena is, however, subject to methodological and ideological
controversies. The approach actors such as the EU take comes across as either
indifferent to or unaware of the power of operationalization – given that the
crucial questions of why (and how) to measure are never substantially
addressed. Although the theoretical controversy between problem-solving and
critical theory (Cox 1981) mirrored here points to the importance of
epistemological awareness, elaborations by, or conversations between the
administrative–governmental and the theoretical–academic dimensions that
offer competing viewpoints on how to operationalize norms are limited.
Accommodating the political dimension of measurement also implies
that procedures and techniques can become standards of good governance
themselves. It is noted on examination in the sense of assessment that ‘the
examination creates a new discursive environment in which new standards
of normalcy are determined’ (Löwenheim 2008, 262). This could result in a
situation where the willingness of target states to comply with assessment
procedures and to use ‘approved’ techniques replace the more fundamental,
political question of what kind of normative substance should be promoted.
The extent to which governments comply with a concept of normality would
then largely be deﬁned by their compliance with administrative normality and
by their participation in a range of programmes, not only with regard to HR.
Resistance to these measurement activities results in several disadvantages,
most importantly restricted funding opportunities. This is not necessarily the
outcome of deliberate decisions to sanction failing compliance but simply the
result of a ‘missing’ statistical identity. In other words, HR (actors) that
cannot be assessed and therefore funded are de facto non-existent and the
same applies to HR violators that are only sanctioned when they are detected
by assessment criteria constructed by techniques. In this respect, technical–
statistical normality could replace normativity.
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Furthermore, the subjectiﬁcation (subjectivation) inherent to the
indicatorization process, apparent in constructions such as ‘human rights
defender’ or the categories of ‘victim’ and ‘violator’ (Sokhi-Bulley 2011,
141), raises the question what kind of subjectivities are produced. The EU
operates with an opaque and implicit understanding of what constitutes a
victim, a violator, or a defender of HR, which are merely used as categories
to quantify success. Considering the distinction between an enjoyment
and obligations approach, ‘[r]ights are seen as one side of a normative
relationship between right-holders and obligation-bearers’ (O’Neill
2005, 430). Categorizations such as victim, which are functional parts of
the ‘protection process’ of funding agencies, construct normative subject
positions that ﬁx individuals within speciﬁc categories. The practice of HR
operationalization can lead to a culture of blame, complaint, and constant
state control (O’Neill 2005), a ‘victimization’ (Bukovská 2008, 10) of the
allegedly passive and powerless that are denied agency in this model.
What I want to draw attention to here is not least that norms as abstract
constructs are usually deﬁned without reference to the subjects they ought
to protect. This does not only mean that the content of these norms is
substantiated in the operationalization process, but that the subjectiﬁcation
inherent to clarifying who is a victim, who is an offender, and who acts as a
defender of HR likewise takes place there. However, the EU’s approach
shows that the construction of subjects is mostly an implicit process,
a by-product of mundane criteria that are mainly concerned with deﬁning
who is eligible for funding. In this regard, deciding about what qualiﬁes as a
project, as an action, or as a victim and defender of HR worth receiving
ﬁnancial support, a step placed before the quantiﬁcation process, remains
remarkably out of sight. This is particularly noteworthy because the
numerical evidence of success or failure evaluated at a later point is based
on these categories.
In the case of the EIDHR, country calls and global calls for proposals ‘are
selected by the Commission in consultation with its local delegations’
(European Commission 2015a). The EU delegations in relevant countries
release guidelines for grant applicants that comprise speciﬁcations on
eligibility criteria. It is beyond the scope of this article to consider these
requirements in more detail. However, it is apparent how formal criteria
alone are already decisive for the success of applications and, in fact, for
deﬁning subjects and actions. The guidelines also contain a non-exhaustive
and vague list of examples of types of actions that are eligible for funding,
such as ‘activities for strengthening of existing civil society’ or ‘awareness
raising public communication’ (e.g. EU Delegation to Namibia 2013, 5–6).
The lack of speciﬁcity is remarkable since this is the very point where HR
are supposed to be operationalized. This demonstrates, again, how the
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substance of these norms is constructed in individualized practices that are –
even on this level – not based on transparent and elaborate deﬁnitions of
what HR are. Further research investigating the concepts and the under-
standing of HR emerging on the micro-level through detailed participant
observation of institutional practices is clearly necessary.
Moreover, in the logic of the EU, efﬁciently managing instruments of HR
and their technical procedures require a certain extent of professionaliza-
tion. The aforementioned construction of weak and passive victims is
intensiﬁed by the fact that individuals whose rights are violated depend on a
professional organization to report, appeal, and apply in their name – even
if these organizations are based in western capitals and only have very
limited direct access to the individuals and the processed data as a whole
(see Bukovská 2008, 11).
In sum, this section presented a theoretical argument about the con-
ceptualization of norms in IR and an empirical one about the practice of
operationalizing norms. In theoretical regards, it showed how the
operationalization of norms is a normative act that ﬁlls abstract HR with
substance. The analysis of the EU’s HR policy suggests that the emerging
normative substance is unspeciﬁc and constructed on the individual level.
This is theoretically important because it conﬁrms that operationalization
in fact deﬁnes what norms are, although often in a way that is less clear and
easily detectable than analytical approaches to norms research would
desire. Deﬁning the meaning of norms is an incredible fragmented, local,
and complex process involving various actors and techniques beyond
the operationalization in terms of measurement described here. This largely
contests widespread assumptions about how the role of norms is
conceptualized in IR. In practical regards, it implies that actors such
as the EU are funding actions and promoting objectives that are likely to
be de-linked from the intentions of those deciding upon these actions in the
ﬁrst place.
Conclusion
Research on norms, often framed by competing logics of actions, mainly
focusses on why and how norms are adopted. Presenting a contrasting
perspective, this article discussed the (technical) operationalization of
norms, thereby shedding light on the neglected implications of how abstract
norms are implemented in practices. I argue that the operationalization
of norms through techniques such as indicatorization does not only lead to
a reconstruction of their substance – symbolized by the transformations
taking place in translation processes – but also that the meaning of abstract
norms is, in fact, only produced in technical procedures. The feedback loop
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of norm operationalization, ﬁlling existing but diffuse norms with sub-
stance, provides a conceptual link between the structured and structural
side of norms. In this approach inspired by governmentality studies,
techniques play a decisive but understudied role for understanding the
normativity of norms that might depart from the intentions or normative
objectives initially held by norm-setters. Departing from the focus on the
decision-making level of conventional norms research, this article zoomed
in on indicators at the core of governance techniques of measurement.
These techniques as perceived rational tools work as a common denomi-
nator, regardless of normative divergence or convergence. The emerging
instrumental homogeneity does not only refer to the broad agreement on
the usefulness of measuring and monitoring, but also to other techniques
widely applied in the ﬁelds of development policy, democracy support, HR
promotion, or infrastructural reforms. Normative disputes or the question
whether decisions are in fact informed by the same normative meaning are
of secondary importance if techniques for operationalizing norms are
uncontested. In that, a technological–procedural regime of best practices is
fundamental to approaches of global governance.
Privileging the process of norm operationalization allows for
conceptualizing the origin of norms in the context of their functional
management, instead of keeping these dimensions separate and sequential.
Norms such as HR are certainly present in treaties, speeches, programmes,
or key documents, which explains their dominant role in IR. However, we
should also consider that the prevalence of indicator-driven approaches
necessitates devoting more attention to techniques of governing since they
provide conditions of possibility for rationalities to emerge. In other words,
normative substance is created through the instrumental operationalization
of norms. The adoption and reproduction of a range of technical solutions
based on instruments signiﬁcantly narrows the agenda of approaches to the
governing of economic, political, and social phenomena.
Instruments of governance are not neutral and objective tools that merely
translate (normative) governmental objectives into practice. The EU’s HR
policy discussed here is an example of how diffuse and abstract norms are
operationalized, mainly for funding purposes. The allocation of substantial
ﬁnancial means, such as the EIDHR, follows existing practices of reporting,
evaluating, and monitoring based on indicators. What counts as favourable
or less favourable HR conditions is supposed to be measured by these
indicators. However, the design and selection of indicators is opaque and
decoupled from the political decision-making process. In other words,
what, how, and why phenomena are measured is unclear and left to the
discretion of the relevant expert bureaucracy. The main ﬁnding of this
empirical illustration is therefore that the entire process of normative
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governing is unsystematic and improvised. The meaning of HR is neither
elaborated nor stabilized on the codiﬁcation or decision-making level; nor is
their substance clearly deﬁned in their operationalization. While indicators
provide an intuitive conceptualization of what HR could mean in the
practice of governing, and thereby produce a certain normativity, they
appear to be formulated on a random basis.
Highlighting the practice of operationalization contests the assumed
ontological priority of normative structures informing actions. However,
the normative feedback loop conceptualized in this article is not meant as a
mere reversal of the decision-action sequence. Instead, the objective is to
draw attention to the reconstruction of rationalities by techniques as a
central part of operationalizing norms without overemphasizing the
autonomous agency of materiality. Nevertheless, the social constructivist
need for ‘bracketing’ – either focussing on the constructed or structuring
qualities of norms – moves to the background if actions are not con-
ceptualized as informed by stable norms but as implemented through
dominant instruments. This contributes to reﬁning and revaluing the
understanding of instruments as fundamental to the normative substance of
international relations.
This article highlights the general importance of norm operationalization
and the need for research on different varieties of norms and how they
operate in practice. While the empirical illustration focusses on the opera-
tionalization of HR in the EU’s administrative bureaucracy, this con-
ceptualization applies to other areas and actors as well. A comprehensive
understanding of what norms are (and how they matter) therefore requires
extensive, detailed analyses instead of parsimonious models.
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